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I. INTRODUCTION * 
 
 ‘No European demos, no European democracy’: According to some widespread be-
liefs the European Union cannot become a full-fledged democratic polity because it lacks a 
well-bounded “European demos”. Traditional Continental European thinking held that the 
‘demos’ (or political community) should coincide with the ‘ethnos’ (or ethnically defined 
homogeneous community).2 Modern democratic theory has de-coupled the demos from the 
ethnos, connecting it to formal legal procedures: “Representative democracy …. requires a 
precisely bounded citizenry, normally defined by membership of a political unit organized 
on a territorial basis, which then elects representatives” (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008: 484).3 
The German Constitutional Court in its 2009 Lisbon Ruling followed this line, linking the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU to the principle of electoral equality and the centrality of 
parliamentary government.4 This position left national parliaments as primary sites for the 
democratic legitimation of the EU’s confederation of states, but, at the same time, dis-
carded their supranational counterpart, the European Parliament. Albeit being directly 
elected since 1979, the EP’s democratic legitimation credentials were found wanting be-
cause of its “unequal” – or digressively proportional – composition. This purely aggregate 
democratic account appears inappropriate for situations such as the EU with a multiplicity 
of overlapping ‘demoi’ of different size. On the one hand, it fails to recognise that Europe’s 
heterogeneity would be ill-suited for a European federal state modelled after majoritarian 
democracy with equal electoral representation.5 On the other hand, exclusive focus on elec-
tions and national parliaments as formal-legal links between citizens and European deci-
sions and power misses important requisites for the democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
These include the interplay of modes of informal representation with processes of Euro-
pean political authorization and accountability. Arguably, citizens’ formal legal equality – 
not only in terms of European electoral rights but including the weight individual votes 
                                               
2 Francis 1965: 70-74, quoted after Peters 2001: 654. 
3 For propositions to decouple the conception of the European demos from notions of the ethnos, see R. 
Lepsius 1986; Habermas 1995; quoted after Peters 2001: 655. 
4 BVerfG, 2 be 2/08 30. 6. 2009. <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> 
5 Note that as a consequence of introducing strict proportionality for the composition of the EP, the minor-
ity of the most populous “demoi” (or territorial constituencies) would dominate the majority of less populous 
ones; for a discussion of the unequal but democratic representation in the European Parliament engaging 
with the GCC Lisbon Ruling, see Lord and Pollak, in Evas, Liebert and Lord (2012). 
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have for the composition of representative assemblies such as the EP – is neither an appro-
priate nor a sufficient condition for constituting democratic legitimacy.   
 
 This paper aims at rethinking the “no European demos” thesis by placing informal, 
non-legal democratic practices centre stage as necessary preconditions for representative 
European Union politics and policy-making. It focuses, in particular, on practices of repre-
senting discourses that constitute the emerging European democratic public sphere. The 
framework of “discursive representation”6 does not focus on representation of persons or 
groups but rather on representation of relevant discourses about issues of EU politics that 
engage in public debates.7 Relevant discourses are those that shape mass public perceptions 
of the EU, reflect European public opinion and engage with European political will forma-
tion not only by supporting but also by challenging it. A variety of public arenas at differ-
ent levels – domestic, supranational, transnational – are involved in selecting and represent-
ing them and shaping their interplay. For instance, European constitutive politics – such as 
EU treaty reforms8 or European elections – entails discursive struggles within fields such as 
mass media communication, national parliamentary debates, or partisan election cam-
paigns. Other sites of discursive representation are the field of European civil society, na-
tional courts and constitutional courts.9  
 
 The present analysis will not further explore the question of how, normatively speak-
ing, the primacy of discursive representation – vis-à-vis formal electoral modes – can be justi-
fied in general and, in particular, for the context of the EU, from a deliberative democratic 
perspective or in view of “Crisis and mutation in the institutions of representation in ‘real-
                                               
6 For the concept, justification and methodology of “discursive representation”, see Dryzek and Niemeyer 
2008. 
7 Erik O. Eriksen has distinguished three types of public sphere – the general open public sphere specialised in 
opinion formation; the segmented, restricted public sphere specialised in problem-solving, and the strong, 
specialised public sphere specialised in will formation (Eriksen 2007: 32). I suggest introducing a fourth type, 
the “public issue” sphere, which is highly specialised but open, and the legitimacy basis of which consists in 
universal norms or public interests.   
8 EU treaty reform processes comprise drafting and signing treaty reforms, typically by “Intergovernmental 
Conferences” – except in the case of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” drafted by the “Con-
vention on the Future of Europe” (2002-3) and signed by the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels 
in December 2004 – and their ratification processes in each of the member states, either by parliamentary 
procedures alone or complemented by popular referendums.  
9 See Liebert and Trenz 2009; Liebert 2010a and Evas and Liebert (2012), Schiek 2012, Closa and Castillo 2012 
and Koch 2012.   
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existing’ European democracies” (Schmitter).10 It concentrates on the empirical questions 
whether, to what extent and why public debates represent political discourses on the issue 
of European democracy, and what kind of democracy this is. Data on print media and par-
liamentary debates from six member states during the EU constitutional treaty reform 
2004-9 will be used to identify discursive representations of EU democracy and how they 
are systematically organized in cross-national comparison. Analyses of emerging European 
political space have identified common models such as the socioeconomic left-right and the 
national – supranational pattern of structuring political conflict. Both have been found in 
citizens' attitudes as well as political parties’ stances towards EU issues (Gabel and Ander-
son 2004; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). The analysis presented here will contribute to this 
research from the angle of the EU’s emerging transnational public sphere as a discursively 
representative space. 
 
 The paper is structured in three parts: It starts with revisiting three major competing 
discourses on democracy two of which question the ‘European demos’ (II.). Then it ex-
plores how these democracy discourses are unevenly represented within the EU’s constella-
tion of polycentric, overlapping public spheres (III.). Subsequently, three driving forces 
behind these discursive practices are discussed: Europeanisation of national public spheres, 
politicisation of the EU and transnational interaction of mass media (IV.). In conclusion I 
argue that if a formally constituted supranational “European demos” is either not viable or 
not deemed necessary, informal practices of discursive representation will be at least the 
second best alternative – or even a prime requisite of EU democracy as they are constitu-
tive for the emerging European public sphere.  
 
 
II. COMPETING DISCOURSES ON EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY  
 The three most relevant discourses on democracy in Europe represent competing 
understandings of normative and institutional presuppositions for EU democratic legiti-
macy11: the “confederation of democratic states”; the “supranational federal democratic 
                                               
10 See Habermas 1996; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008: 484ff, and Schmitter 2012. 
11  See Eriksen 2007; Eriksen and Fossum 2009; 2011; Liebert 2010b; Franzius and Preuß 2011. 
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state”, and the “regional political association of citizens and states”. Each of these differ-
ently frames the conditions for a democratic constitution of the EU.12 And each narrative 
looks at the “no European demos” thesis from a different angle.  
  
 1. The EU as a regulatory international regime dependent on the democratic 
Member States: This model represents liberal ideas about the EU as an international regu-
latory regime that cannot be democratic (Dahl 1999; Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón 1999). 
Nor does it need a Constitution (Grimm 1995; cf. Habermas 1995). Instead, it derives its 
legitimacy from the sovereign democratic member states that delegate powers to EU-level 
agents. From the nation state view on democracy, the EU depends on indirect forms of 
democratic legitimation through representative government of the people that is anchored 
in national elections and parliamentary procedures. Compared to the primacy of national 
parliamentary elections, European elections are usually secondary national ones. Democ-
ratic input legitimation through direct participation by citizens is considered an exception 
since output legitimation is the rule (cf. Closa 2005; Peters 2005; Scharpf 1999). The top-
down Europeanization of public communication will remain segmented along national 
borders (Sifft et al. 2007). National constitutional courts rather than national publics will 
define the norms on which the legitimacy of the EU regulatory regime rests.  
 
 2. The EU as a federal supranational state with its own source of democratic le-
gitimacy: This narrative posits “monistic ideas of Europe as democracy” upfront (Liebert 
2010b: 53ff). The model of federal multinational democracy engages with the ‘European 
demos’ thesis in so far as “the legitimacy of its law stems from the autonomy presumption 
that it is made by the people or their representatives – the pouvoir constituant” (Eriksen & Fos-
sum 2011: 25). But different from the ethnic reading of the ‘European demos’ the latter is 
conceived primarily “as a legally integrated community” shaped by the democratic consti-
tutional state (id.: 25/26). By its very nature, the ‘European demos’ is a plurality – a multi-
national European “demoi-cracy”.13 Yet, some of its advocates claim the model of a Euro-
pean political community ought to be premised at least on “a sense of common destiny”, 
                                               
12 A discursive frame is defined as a mode of contextualising issues of European politics in a broader frame of 
reference. 
13 For the first to introduce this term, see K. Nicolaidis 2004; similarly, J. Bohman 2007.  
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“an ‘imagined common fate’ induced by common vulnerabilities, so as to turn people into 
compatriots willing to take on collective obligations to provide for each other’s well-being” 
(id.). Others require the ‘European demos’ to profess a sense of common identity, shared 
pre-political values, and a collective memory of the past (Graf Kielmansegg 1996; cf. Lie-
bert 2011). By comparison, the German Constitutional Court contented itself with requir-
ing EU parliamentary elections based on the principle of citizens’ political equality – sug-
gesting the ‘European demos’ – notwithstanding its multinational heterogeneity – should 
engage with a majoritarian representative democracy.14 From comparative perspective, the 
European Parliament is certainly a “deviant case” (Rose 2012), while from the angle of de-
liberative democratic theory, the ambiguities of whether the co-decision procedure can 
qualify as “the panacea for EU democracy” is questionable (Stie 2009).  
 
 3. The EU as a transnational democratic association of citizens and states: While 
the first narrative of democracy in Europe underscores the diversity of national democra-
cies, and the uniform presuppositions of European democracy are writ large by the second 
federal model, the third one frames the EU as a novel kind of political community that 
reconciles plurality of citizens with transnational patterns of convergence. This polity mo-
del differs from an international regime insofar as it is not only diplomatically established 
by interstate negotiations but also involves a “multilevel parliamentary field” as the “de-
mocratic backbone” (Crum and Fossum 2012) and, moreover, constitutive political prac-
tices by the citizens. It diverges from a supranational state because its legitimacy relies on 
two specific sources: international law, and in particular cosmopolitan principles, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, informal practices of European democratic integration, in-
cluding contestations (Tully 2006).15  Democratic practices from below originate in trans-
national social movements, European civil society and a transnationalizing public sphere.16  
                                               
14 For a critical assessment of the 2009 Lisbon Ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court, see Lord 
and Pollak “Unequal Representation in the European Parliament. A Comment on the Ruling by the German 
Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty”, in Evas, Liebert, Lord (2012), and for a comparative analysis of 
“Representation in Parliamentary Democracies – The European Parliament as a Deviant Case”, see Richard 
Rose, id.  
15  See Eriksen and Fossum 2000, 2007; Habermas 2008; cf. Bohman 2007. 
16 For an account of the transnational public sphere, see Fraser 2005. For European democratic practices from 
below, see: Imig & Tarrow 2001; Della Porta & Tarrow 2005; Eder 2007; Bohman 2007. The concept of ‘civil 
society’ as it is used here includes three distinct sectors, namely the ‘civic sector’ (also ‘third sector’, ‘volun-
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Moreover, public arenas of European political debate – whether electoral or non-electoral – 
may also qualify as sources of democratic practices, if conceived as “chambers of dis-
courses” that ensure “discursive representation” where “each relevant discourse gets articu-
late representation” (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008).  A key question regarding the viability 
of a democratic Euro-polity is whether these discursive practices help European citizens 
constitute a European demos – a political community that facilitates democratic govern-
ance beyond the state.  One important issue is whether or not these practices ease or im-
pede similar political discourses across Europe.  To investigate this question, we must ex-
amine whether EU discourses across a range of different public arenas are consistent with 
prominent models of EU political space: socio-economic left-right and national – suprana-
tional (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Liebert 2007).  
 
 As regards the issue of the ‘European demos’, the first of these three narratives dis-
misses any such claims as not being relevant to the EU’s indirect type of legitimacy that 
derives from member state democracies. The second narrative would endorse either the 
‘European demos’ in the singular or the ‘European demoi’ in the plural as a necessary and 
desirable foundation for European federal democracy, albeit with varying political and/or 
pre-political and even ethnic connotations. The third model replaces collectivist, unitary 
premises through the conception of a decentred European citizenry and discursive practices 
that arguably move the EU beyond a nationally fragmented European demoi-cracy to-
wards a transnational European polity.   
 
 To examine whether and to what extent these democratic narratives are represented 
in European discursive practices, the next section will present and discuss selected findings 
from two processes of EU constitutive politics – namely treaty reform and European elec-
tions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
tary’, ‘community’ or ‘non-profit’ sector) that is conceived as the sphere of social activity undertaken by 
organisations that are for non-profit, non-governmental and represent general interests, the ‘economic’ or 
‘capital’ sphere denoting the for profit ‘private sector’, constituted by organised economic and professional 
interest groups, including employers’ and business associations, and the political sphere, constituted by parti-
san organisations. See Galtung 1999; Liebert and Trenz 2010; Liebert and Trenz 2009a; Michailidou, Trenz 
and de Wilde (2012). 
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III. DISCURSIVE REPRESENTATION PRACTICES: FINDINGS17  
  The European public sphere is a “communicative space in the making” (Fossum and 
Schlesinger 2007) that comprises multiple national, sub- and transnational arenas. For 
evaluation of European democratic norms in discursive representation practices, domestic 
communication arenas have been selected from six national contexts: France, Germany and 
the UK for the old member states, and the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland for the 
new members. The analysis draws on three sets of cross-national comparative data: national 
print media coverage of EU Constitutional Treaty ratification (2004-7); national parliamen-
tary ratification debates; and 2009 European election campaigns.18 We applied the method 
of ‘Comparative Political Discourse Analysis’ (ComPDA) to assess the salience of democ-
ratic norms in European discursive practices in the mass media, in parliamentary arenas, 
and in political parties’ European election campaigns.19  
 
 The following summarises major research findings under three headings: (1) the con-
tribution of national mass media to public information about the EU; (2) the role of na-
tional parliaments in articulating political conflict over the EU; and (3) Dimensions of po-
litical conflict in European election campaigns.  
 
 1. National media contributing to mass public information about the EU  
(2004-7): Print media coverage of the EU constitutional reform process has been studied in 
single case studies and a few paired comparisons. The following assessment draws on the 
most comprehensive data set to date. Summarising the results, several important findings 
                                               
17 For further details and extended data in the Appendix, see Liebert 2011.  
18  For a description of the quantitative and qualitative samples compiled from three arenas of European po-
litical communication, see Appendix, Table 1 “RECON (ConstEPS) I, II, III Data Sets”. These data were 
compiled by two research project teams, with comparative political and social scientists (ConstEPS and RE-
CON WP5, based at the Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies, University of Bremen). My thanks for 
collaboration on compiling and analysing the cross-national comparative data sets go to Aleksandra Maatsch 
(Poland), Kathrin Packham (Germany, UK), Petra Rakušanová Guasti (Czech Republic) and Tatjana Evas 
(Estonia, Latvia); to Ewelina Pawlak and Alexander Gattig for quantitative data analysis and research man-
agement, including the summer school ‘Advanced methods of media analysis’ (July/August 2007, University 
of Bremen). The empirical data sets on which the following summaries are based were generated in collabora-
tive coding sessions by teams of junior researchers with expertise from different member states, supervised by 
Aleksandra Maatsch and Kathrin Packham, and led by WP5 coordinators Ulrike Liebert (UniHB) and Hans-
Jörg Trenz (ARENA, University of Oslo). See also Trenz, Vetters, Jentges 2009. 
19 For a full description of ComPDA, see Liebert, Maatsch and Packham 2010.   
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stand out. Generally speaking, we find the print media to have benefited democratic prac-
tices in the EU constitutional reform process in three respects (see Table 1, below):  
 
 First, the quantitative record is noteworthy regarding the extent of space which the 
media devoted to covering EU treaty reform: Regarding the extent to which the media 
covered EU treaty reforms and put it on the public agenda, a total of 8500 articles were 
retrieved over a 25-month period from more than 30 news media outlets in the six coun-
tries under research.20 In this respect the printed press can be said to contribute to an in-
formed European demos by translating the highly specific and complex contents into 
frames that are interesting for readers and thus, arguably, enable them to make informed 
choices between political opinions.  
 
 Secondly, media coverage of EU treaty reform deploys democratic frames for inter-
preting these issues.21 The media more often than not do frame EU issues in democratic 
language that transcends traditional nation state conceptions (MI, Table 1) and reflects a 
supranational federal polity (MII, Table 1), but much less a cosmopolitan-regional rights 
based community.  
 
                                               
20 (see Appendix, Table 3).  
21 The mass media cover EU treaty reforms typically linking this issue to diverse topics of domestic public 
interest, among them Enlargement and Turkey, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Union 
Budget, Social Policy, Energy and Transport, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights (UK) and Major-
ity Voting (Poland). But news media coverage of the Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty also featured 
democratic frames, most of them reflecting institutional features and policies that indicate a supranational 
model of European democracy, followed suit by national democratic frames. 
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Table 1: Patterns of Discursive Representation in National Print Media Coverage of EU 
Treaty Reform (2005-7) 
 a) coverage b) salience c)inclusiveness 
(% N – EU) 
d) scope 
(% N – EU – U) 
CzR 1049 (6) M I 67 – 29 60 – 22 – 18 
France 2689 (4) M II 45  – 55 24 – 65 – 11 
Germany 2624 (6) M II 26 – 74 30 – 52 – 18 
HUN 583 (6) M II 28 – 72 26 – 58 – 16 
PL 979 (5) M II 70 – 29 32 – 56 – 12 
UK 659 (5) M I 38 – 61 34 – 56 – 10 
Notes: a) print media coverage measured by total number of articles on topic area, in parentheses, no. of outlets included in media sample 
(Appendix, Table 3); b) three discursive models of democracy, coded with Atlas.ti contents analysis of salience of “Reform Treaty” vs. 
“Constitutional Treaty” as “topics” in qualitative print media sample; c) proportion of national vs. non-national voices, in % ; d) propor-
tion of national (N) vs. European (EU) vs. universal (U) topics and types of justifications coded in selected print media sample.  Source: 
RECON II data set (see Appendix Table 1). 
 
 In addition, third, the news media do not restrict their coverage to national political 
actors but include a proportion of European and non-national voices as well. Last, but not 
least, regarding their transnational communication performance, media practices can be 
said to improve the preconditions for a pluralist European political community of citizens 
by developing political communication about publicly shared concerns of EU politics 
across national boundaries.22 This claim is supported by evidence from overlapping trans-
national public spheres, for instance cross-national news and opinion exchanges about is-
sues of EU treaty ratification and reform. Cross-nationally shared concerns with collective 
                                               
22 Regarding media based transnational communication patterns, 15 out of 20 media outlets scrutinised here 
most vigorously developed cross-border dimensions of European political communication during the initial 
phase of constitutional treaty ratification and crisis. 
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European problems are frequently framed by multinational federal lenses, albeit usually 
linked to different topics of domestic relevance.23 
 
 Turning now to a more critical note on print media performance, the following can 
be observed. First of all, although the media pay considerable attention to European and 
non-national political and institutional actors – sometimes even more than to national ac-
tors – overall discursive diversity is quite limited. A minority of news outlets devotes cov-
erage to non-political actors, such as economic or civil society organisations.24 The discur-
sive patterns of media based EU communication are defined by European institutional and 
national state actors and political parties, with restricted space for voices from those social 
constituencies that the media have deemed worthy of coverage. Moreover, news media that 
employ an argumentative mode are also in a critical minority. The media do report on EU 
treaty negotiations, ratification failure and crisis. But as evaluation of the discursive quality 
of EU coverage by 20 news media demonstrates, only a minority devote space to substan-
tive arguments and discussions between different political and social actors or even develop 
their own critical evaluations.  
 
 Scrutiny of mass media based European political communication about the EU 
brings strengths and weaknesses of national media performance to the fore. Lack of discur-
sive pluralism and limited representation of civil society voices is certainly a restriction if 
the media were to play a key role in the communicative integration of a European political 
community. On the other side, regarding media coverage of the EU Constitutional Treaty 
and its Lisbon Treaty, this clearly transcends the national realm. Transnational mutual ob-
servation and discursive interaction with non-national actors increase the leverage of the 
mass media in promoting transnational discourses on EU politics.  
                                               
23 A look at the top three topics that the media linked to EU treaty reform shows that issues regarding the 
‘deepening’ of European integration took precedence, but that ‘widening’ was high on the agenda as well. In 
particular in the Czech Republic and in France the potential accession of Turkey to the Union was on top of 
heated domestic debates, and enlargement-related issues also received high attention in Germany and Hun-
gary. The Polish ‘red line’ on the terms of majority voting in the Council was not only important in parlia-
mentary debates but made it prominently into the news, too (see Maatsch 2010). 
24 We analysed EU treaty reform coverage by 20 news media outlets from six member states qualitatively in 
depth, finding that only 8 of them devoted limited space to public intellectuals, experts, civil society organisa-
tions or representatives from interest organisations.  
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 2. The role of national parliaments in shaping political conflict over the EU25: 
According to the EU constitutional settlement, national parliaments play a key role in de-
mocratic legitimation of EU constitutional reform. Moreover, following the deliberative 
democratic approach, parliamentary representation consists of ongoing processes of com-
munication between representatives and constituents.26 From this perspective, it is an im-
portant question whether and which democratic norms are discursively represented in par-
liamentary debates. The following summarises the most important findings regarding par-
liamentary practices in EU constitutional politics:  
 
 First, for the period 2004 – 9, the centrality of parliamentary proceedings for domes-
tic EU constitutional politics can be confirmed. In the most recent Constitutional and Lis-
bon Treaty reforms, ratification was subjected to referendums in six member states. Yet, in 
all 27 member states but one – Ireland – parliaments remained firmly in control of ratifica-
tion procedures. Nationally elected representatives kept the decisive say, albeit with con-
siderable variation regarding the extensiveness of plenary debates. Measured by the num-
bers of plenary sessions they devoted to debating ratification of the Constitutional and Lis-
bon Reform Treaties, the assemblies of France (11 sessions), Poland (9 sessions), Germany 
(8 sessions) and the UK (8 sessions) basically performed their task of communicating EU 
treaty reforms to the national public (see table 2, below).     
 
 Secondly, our assessment of alternative democracy frames in national parliamentary 
discourses demonstrates the salience of national models over supranational or cosmopolitan 
models of democracy in the EU. Only in the French and, to a minor degree, in the Hun-
garian debates, did parliamentary discourses privilege a supranational democratic EU. The 
conception of a cosmopolitan regional Union gained considerably less visibility. However, 
on a closer look, references to the three different models in parliamentary discourses vary, 
depending on which national and EU institutions or policy areas are under debate. Addi-
tionally, right-wing parties share a more uniform position with respect to the ‘EU of the 
                                               
25 This research cluster was supervised by Aleksandra Maatsch (Jean Monnet Centre, University of Bremen), 
the comparative data set was elaborated and analysed by Ewelina Pawlak. For a more elaborate presentation 
of the results, see Maatsch 2010. 
26 See Mansbridge 2003; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008.  
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nation-states’ and opposing a ‘Federal Europe’. Many governmental and some large opposi-
tion parties favour more diversity, advocating pragmatically variable models of democracy, 
depending on the policy issue or institutional domains under consideration.27  
 
 Yet, third, the inclusiveness of parliamentary debates in terms of their discursive di-
versity is limited, in particular due to the predominance of government speakers. In the 
German ratification debate, speakers from the Government took the largest share of the 
floor, while in the Polish Sejm and the British House of Commons their role was more 
constrained, leaving debate of the contentious treaty to other parliamentary groups. In 
most cases, parliamentary discourses show less consensus orientation and a more adversar-
ial style. While less than a quarter of all statements made by MP’s in plenary debates are 
neutral in tone, we find two articulate camps of political party groups with opposing posi-
tions on treaty ratification. Although the No-votes are in the clear minority – even in the 
British case the 348 Yes-votes outnumber the 204 No’s in the Lisbon ratification – the op-
ponents are over-proportionately vocal and account for a quarter to a third of all state-
ments that express negative positions (id.). Yet, as Maatsch has demonstrated in a cross-
national comparison, the intraparliamentary political divisions between Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats are stronger than divisions between old and new EU member 
states: ‘Political parties belonging to the same ideological group do not only share the same 
positions on EU institutional and policy reform but also share very similar discourses for 
justifying these positions’ (id.).  
 
 Fourth, regarding their transnational scope, empirical evidence from our research 
suggests that parliamentary practices in domestic EU politics exhibit a mixed picture. On 
the one hand, the salience of democratic norms and procedures as topics of parliamentary 
treaty ratification debates appears noteworthy. Among the top ten topics debated most 
intensively, the mode of treaty ratification ranked highest on the agendas of the British, 
Polish, French and Hungarian parliamentarians. The Council decision-making procedure 
was another topic that received much attention, namely the use of qualified majority vot-
ing, as well as issues of EU decision-making procedures and institutional architecture. A 
                                               
27  See Maatsch 2010 and Maatsch, in Evas, Liebert and Lord (2012). 
  15 
 
third prominent issue was citizens’ rights, the Charter of Fundamental rights and, in the 
Hungarian case, minority rights.28 Finally, although the discursive quality of parliamentary 
ratification proceedings in the three old and three new EU member states varies considera-
bly, the parliamentary discourses share a number of common features. Parliamentary de-
bates represent, in particular, concerns about direct democratic procedures of EU treaty 
ratification, on the one hand, coupled with attachments to national democratic frames, on 
the other. France and Germany present two deviations from this pattern: While in German 
parliamentary debate the referendum option has not made it into the top topics of debate, 
French representatives have put this topic centre stage.  
 
Table 2: National Parliamentary EU Treaty Ratification Debates (2004-9) 
b) salience  a) coverage 
M I M II M III 
c)inclusiveness d) scope 
CzR 6 95 23 5 25 G – 74 P N > EU 
France 11 101 207 4 32 G – 65 P EU > N 
Germany 8 165 170 35 46 G – 52 P EU > N 
HUN 5 22 47 41 34 G – 61 P EU > N 
PL 9 355 210 40 3 G – 94 P N > EU 
UK 8 458 299 44 12 G – 84 P N > EU 
Notes: a) number of plenary debates (Appendix, Table 2); b) three discursive models of democracy, in number of codes resulting from 
Atlas.ti contents analysis of references to three respective sets of values, institutions and processes in plenary debates; c) proportion of gov-
ernment vs. MP speakers, in %; d) proportion of national (N) vs. European (EU) topics and types of justifications in debates. Source: 
RECON I data set (Appendix, Table 1).  
 
 In sum, the polarised nature of the debates – in part due to the schedule for parlia-
mentary ratification debates – appears an unfortunate handicap for non-partisan actors, 
experts and civil society organisations. All cases of parliamentary treaty debates considered 
here, except the Polish one, suffer from the same caveat: they are scheduled after the fact, 
after national governments and EU elites have typically concluded treaty negotiations ‘be-
hind closed doors’, and without involving the opposition and minority parties. Lack of 
parliamentary debates in the early stages of EU treaty reforms not only inhibits cross-party 
                                               
28 See Appendix, Table 6.  
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consensus orientation but also prohibits sufficient media coverage to educate the general 
public. Both would be required to enable interested citizens to inform themselves and to 
allow for participation in public opinion formation at a relatively early stage of binding 
intergovernmental decision-making.29 The ex-post intervention of parliaments forecloses 
the coupling of parliamentary debates with media based public opinion formation early 
enough to give citizens and civil society a chance to meaningfully and constructively en-
gage with important issues of EU treaty reform.30 
 
 3. Dimensions of political conflict in European election campaigns: The third data 
set consulted here has been compiled from print media coverage of the 2009 European elec-
tion campaigns in six EU member states.31 The most important findings will be summa-
rised in four points (see Table 3, below):  
 
 First, judging by the hypothesis that the European elections were “second order” na-
tional elections dominated by domestic themes, but much less prominent than the latter, it 
comes as a surprise that the European elections were quite extensively covered by the mass 
media, namely in France, the Czech Republic, Germany and Hungary and, to a minor de-
gree, also in the UK and Poland.  
 
 Even more surprising, secondly, is the discursive representation of democratic norms 
where the second model of a federal European democracy outrivals the others. Here, na-
tional democratic statist discourses are clearly of a second order. In all but the two national 
contexts of the Czech Republic and the UK, the multinational federal frame counts as by 
far the most salient.   
 
 Yet, third, regarding the diversity of voices that are included, the conspicuous bulk of 
media attention is devoted to populist, right-wing fringe parties who take a decidedly Euro-
                                               
29 However, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty upgraded the rights for participation of national parliaments in an early 
phase of the EU legislative process. 
30 A similar argument has been made by Fossum and Trenz (2007: 211), though referring to the French and 
Dutch ratification referendums in 2005 and not to national parliamentary ratification procedures as catalysts 
for politicisation and domestic sources of democratic legitimation of the EU. 
31 See Maatsch 2011b. For more information on both data sets, see Appendix, Table 1.  
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sceptic stance, namely, for example, the Front National (FN) in France, Jobbik in Hun-
gary, Libertas in Poland, and the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) as well as the 
British National Party (BNP) in Great Britain. While such voices were largely absent in the 
German EP discourse, their electoral success also drew attention to the phenomenon there. 
The Dutch Freedom Party as well as the British Eurosceptic parties were duly covered in 
the German media. European level actors such as influential (former) Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs), domestic EU Commissioners or Commission President 
Baroso were given space in most of the media.  
 
Table 3: Patterns of Discursive Representation in EP Election Campaigns (2009) 
b) salience  a) coverage 
M I M II M III 
c)inclusiveness 
% National – EU 
d) scope 
N – EU – Univ. 
CzR 665 (5) 36 34 0 69  – 31 31 – 54 – 15 
France 826 (4) 43 73 4 78  –  21 34 – 46 – 20 
Germany 8558 (5) 66 83 5 76 – 24 36 – 54 – 10  
HUN 5414 (6) 48 59 6 84 – 16 61 – 21 – 18  
PL 111 (5) 83 177 17 54 – 28  44 – 48 – 8  
UK 8267 (5) 65 56 10 72 – 26  64 – 36 – 0  
Notes: a) print media coverage measured by total number of articles on topic area, in parentheses, no. of outlets included in media sample 
(Appendix, Table 3); b) salience of three discursive models of democracy, in number of references to three respective sets of values, institu-
tions and processes in qualitative print media sample; c) proportion of national vs. EU voices, in % (id.); d) proportion of national (N) 
vs. European (EU) vs. universal (U) types of justifications in selected print media sample coding (id.).  Source: RECON III data set 
(see Appendix, Table 1). 
 
 Finally, fourth, as established wisdom holds that European elections typically deal 
with domestic political issues – therefore constituting ‘second order elections’ – it is sur-
prising but a matter of fact that the EU Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament and insti-
tutional questions of the Council and the Commission were the top topics on the 2009 
election campaign agendas.32 Moreover, the analysis of discursive patterns of media based 
                                               
32 At the time of the European elections in June 2009, ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was still pending as 
the second Irish Referendum was scheduled to be held in early October of the same year. This does not mean, 
though, that in the 2009 debates, domestic topics did not play any role. For instance, in the Czech Republic, 
the fall of the Topolanek government and the scandal involving paparazzi pictures taken in Silvio Berlus-
coni’s villa made the news. German public debates revolved around the ‘Super Election Year’ with national 
 18 
 
election campaigns shows that argumentative modes of referring to non-national, European 
and transnational problems, ideas and interests are extensively used, outnumbering national 
discourses.33  
 
 
IV. EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERES  
 The three fields of European communication examined here – starting before the 
2005 constitutional ratification failures and extending to the 2009 Lisbon treaty and EP 
election campaigns – provide selected insights into the patterns and dynamics of discursive 
representation in an unfolding European public sphere. Summarising what the available 
evidence reveals about the preconditions for a democratic EU I have presented mixed find-
ings from different kinds of public sphere: Media messages, on the one hand, tend to con-
struct an image of a supranational EU that shapes public opinion but does not necessarily 
translate into “strong public spheres”, such as national parliaments or constitutional 
courts.34 National parliamentary discourses, on the other hand, reproduce an image of a 
Union, the legitimacy of which depends on the democratic member states and that stands 
in stark contrast to the narratives of a supranational federal Union, which recent European 
election campaigns have evoked. 
 
 When engaging with the issues of the EU’s democratic legitimacy and its legitimacy 
deficit or contested democratic norms, in particular, the mass media, national parliamen-
tarians as well as European parliamentary candidates and political parties engage discourses 
that do not cohere. But two of the most relevant European democracy discourses identified 
above clearly extend across national communication communities: they connect, overlap 
and become shared transnational discourses. European democratic norms have become a 
relevant issue of public debate, multiple and multilayered European public spheres are 
                                                                                                                                                   
parliament elections coming up in September. In Hungary, Fidesz’ call for new elections as well as the emer-
gence of the far-right were widely discussed. British discourse focused on the expenses scandal involving a 
number of national MPs, and the success of the BNP which was anticipated to take advantage of voters’ dis-
satisfaction over the performance of the main political parties.  
33 In fact, mass media coverage of the European election campaigns in the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
and Poland feature this pattern.  
34 In this regard the Lisbon Ruling by the German Constitutional Court is a case in point; see Liebert 2010c; 
Evas and Liebert 2010.   
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emerging, yet a ‘European demos’ is missing. These findings call for rethinking the conven-
tional wisdom regarding the “no European demos – no European democracy” thesis, out-
lined above. There must be other mechanisms to account for these dynamics.  
 
 To account for the emergence of transnational public spheres in the EU, two mecha-
nisms have been identified in the literature: the Europeanisation of national public 
spheres35 and the politicisation of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Our 
findings on discursive representation suggest two more driving forces: democratic integra-
tion through the mass media; and transnationalisation through civil society.  
 
 (1) As to the widespread belief that it was wrong to expect Europeanisation of na-
tional public spheres to happen in the near future (Grimm 1995, Graf Kielmansegg 1996, 
Peters 2005), empirical evidence from the EU’s most recent development is testimony to 
the contrary: European integration has mobilised the most extensive as well as intense de-
bates about European issues across a range of national public spheres. The patterns and 
dynamics of Europeanisation in different national contexts are shaped, in the first place, by 
institutional settings and democratic political cultures. Variations in the quantity and qual-
ity of Europeanisation of national public spheres are no surprise, given the uneven devel-
opment of member state democratic systems, with weakly consolidated democratic institu-
tions and civil society organisations that have not reached full independence from the state 
or that have fallen into new external and internal dependencies.36  
 
 (2) In the context of national diversity, for explaining the Europeanisation of public 
spheres, politicisation is a key part of the story. The established wisdom on this matter is 
that politicisation is not a cure for the EU’s democratic deficit. Pointing out the risks of 
such an approach, Stefano Bartolini has warned not to delude ourselves into thinking that 
‘politicisation’ of the EU is ‘the right sort of medicine to cure the EU’s ills’ (Bartolini 
                                               
35 Cf. discussion of the state of European public sphere research by Thomas Risse (2010) who engages the 
most comprehensive range of empirical findings from European public sphere research to date, though indi-
cating two conspicuous lacunae: first, regarding the new East/East Central European member states, and, 
second, developments following failure of the EU constitutional treaty. 
36 For comparative analyses of the national media systems of Europe see, among others, Hallin and Mancini 
2004; Sparks and Reading 1997; Splichal 1994; Sükösd and Bajomi-Lázár 2003. 
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2006). Yet, nor can politicization of the EU be reduced to a force that undermines the long-
standing ‘permissive consensus’ for European integration and drives the ‘constraining dis-
sensus’ vis-à-vis the EU by mobilising collective identities (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Poli-
ticisation of the EU’s technocratic-bureaucratic regime contributes to the public awareness 
and mobilisation of European civil society that democratic integration of Europe requires 
(Tully 2006; Liebert 2010b).  The contentious nature and protracted struggles involved in 
the politics of EU treaty reform have certainly provoked controversies among political 
elites which have spilled over from institutional arenas – namely intergovernmental bodies, 
national governments, parliaments and parties, as well as courts – into media based political 
communication and civil society, to finally reach mass publics. Thus, politicisation has 
promoted European public communication practices. But will these practices qualify for 
democratic integration?  
 
 (3) In the context of Europeanisation and politicisation, the mass media may serve as 
catalysts for disseminating democratic norms or, to borrow Tully’s term, for democratic 
integration (Tully 2006). The media can foster democratic integration from below at two 
levels. On the one side, by choosing to present an EU issue, by framing the issue content, 
and constructing the media messages that shape people’s perceptions (Fortunato 2005: 56) 
in ways that resonate with democratic practices: informing readers about European issues, 
setting the stage for the formation of European public opinion, for structuring political 
conflict about the EU, and for holding authorities to account. On the other side, the media 
may choose to selectively frame EU issues in terms of democratic norms, that is not pri-
marily whether as a matter of national sovereignty, or in terms of left/right ideological or 
class conflict. By adopting democratic interpretive schemes the media suggest to the public 
how to think about given issues. Thus, they can help channel the politicisation of the EU 
and Europeanisation of public spheres into democratic frameworks for European integra-
tion. If politicisation of EU affairs is necessary for Europeanisation of national public 
spheres, it is not sufficient for democratic integration practices. If we define the democratic 
integration of Europe as a transnational process of structuring public opinion and political 
will formation on European issues in political ideological terms, the question about the 
democratic frames that the mass media selectively deploy plays a key role.  This is the ques-
  21 
 
tion whether and which democratic narratives on the EU are discursively represented to 
mass publics. For instance, if the mass media engage with supranational or transnational 
democracy discourses as outlined above, European citizens and civil society and not pri-
marily intergovernmental conferences will become visible front-page agents and constitu-
ents of the would-be democratic EU polity. When framing the EU as a matter of democ-
racy, the national media will engender pluralist arenas for contentious debates, with trans-
national scope. Thus, not only in their contents and frames but also in their communica-
tion practices the media can contribute to European democratic integration through fram-
ing public information and communication about the EU in democratic terms. Transcend-
ing nationalistic or technocratic frames, they will address the same issues from multiper-
spectival angles. While giving voice to diverse constituencies, they will engender the inter-
play between different languages and conflicting frames for justification.   
 
 (4) The last question to be addressed here is how politicisation, Europeanisation and 
democratic integration of public spheres will be affected by the inclusion of European civil 
society. Conceiving political communication as a configuration of social practices, the me-
dia engage in relationships with different types of agents. According to Johan Galtung, in 
the triangular relations between state, economic and civil society actors, the media ‘take a 
challenging place in a field of conflicts’; floating somewhere between these pillars, they are 
‘vital channels not only for the Civil society in relation to the State and Capital, but also in 
communication between the State and Capital in order to ensure a common public sphere 
and dialogue in society’ (Galtung 1999; 3f).37 Analytically, all three pillars can provide con-
tents to the media. In the practices of mass media representations in the field of EU consti-
tutive politics, primarily national and EU institutional discourses and discourses by gov-
ernments and political parties are included. Thus far, national and European economic in-
terest organisations have been discursively represented much less and European civil soci-
ety was only very marginally able to raise critical voices. Yet, empirical evidence suggests 
that the potential and willingness of European civil society to constructively engage with 
contentious issues of European constitutional treaty reform is a matter of fact (Liebert 
                                               
37 See Johan Galtung’s proposal of a three-sided model of society with three pillars: the State, Capital and 
Civil Society (Galtung 1999). 
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2010a; Liebert and Trenz 2010; Trenz et al. 2010). Moreover, given the evolving transna-
tional networks of organised civil society in the EU, more inclusive discursive representa-
tion practices would not only promote the scope of discourses that are relevant to the ex-
periences and perceptions of a plurality of constituencies. European civil society would also 
become an agent of transnational discursive representation – arguably a primary prerequi-
site of EU democracy (see Bohman 2007).   
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Compared to the classical statist discourses on the EU as intergovernmental confed-
eration of nation states or as supranational federal state, a more recent proposition is to 
understand the EU as a novel type of a transnational non-state political association that is 
constituted by states and by citizens who act in their dual role of nationals as well as Euro-
peans.38 The intention of this paper was to examine the pre-requisites for the would-be de-
mocratic EU polity and, in particular, the “no European demos” thesis by refocusing from 
missing formal-legal conditions to informal social and communicative presuppositions. 
Refocusing the analysis from the “European demos” – conceived of in formal-legal terms of 
equal European political citizenship – meant to put informal extralegal terms of discursive 
representation practices centre stage. In theory, for EU democratic legitimacy, equal voting 
is conventionally considered a sufficient formal requisite that can be supposed to link the 
people to EU decision-making, either via national parliaments and/or governments or via 
European elections. But in the multiple overlapping European citizenship practices, strictly 
egalitarian norms would be either unwanted or are undermined by a range of domestic 
level impediments.39 Therefore, for democratically constituting a European political will, 
transnational public spheres that represent all relevant discourses appear a primary requi-
site (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008: 481f.).  Transnational discursive representation practices 
are primary to – but do not substitute by any means – formal legal requirements for de-
                                               
38 For an elaboration of a similar proposition, see Franzius and Preuß 2011.  
39 Such impediments range from institutional barriers against Union citizens (in particular EU movers) exer-
cising European voting rights; over lack of access to relevant European public information as an enabling 
condition for casting an informed vote to the varying willingness of national political parties to communicate 
about EU issues and structure European political conflict in publicly intelligible ways. 
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mocratic representation. They are a constitutive precondition for informed mass publics, 
for public opinion formation about European issues and, ultimately, for deliberation aimed 
at political consensus (Habermas 1996).  
 
 Examining alternative narratives about democracy in Europe sheds also new light on 
critical episodes of EU constitutive political development. After all, the decline of the 
“demos” thesis has left double lacunae after the failure of some EU projects, such as the 
Constitutional Treaty.40 The present analysis suggests why the politicisation of the EU 
may have ambiguous effects. In fact, by mobilising collective identities, the politicisation of 
European integration may enhance a ‘constraining dissensus’ about reconfiguration of the 
EU’s jurisdictional architecture (Hooghe and Marks 2008).41 Yet, politicisation may also 
have beneficial effects regarding the Europeanisation and transnationalisation of national 
public spheres, collective identities, the deepening and widening of the EU and, notably, 
for developing democracy (Risse 2010: 177ff). In any case, whether ‘politicisation’ will cure 
the EU’s deficits of democratic legitimacy cannot be answered without exploring discursive 
representation practices and whether or not these are democratically framed and how. 
Ours confirm Risse’s, calling into question the conventional wisdom about ordinary citi-
zens who are allegedly wedded to the nation-state while perceiving the EU as a distant en-
tity (Moravcsik 2006; Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón 1999).  They shed light on the patterns 
and dynamics of democratisation dynamics from below, in the absence – or after the de-
cline – of the ‘European demos’. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
40 Cf. Moravcsik 2006. 
41For instance, despite considerable public debate and referendum turnout the majority of the French and 
Dutch rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty is another case in point where EU leaders 
only succeeded in ratifying by forestalling referendums and thus manifestations of popular opposition.  
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APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION 
Table 1: RECON I, II, III. Data Sets  
 
 RECON  I  
Parliamentary data 
set 2009 
ConstEPS/RECON II 
TCE media data set  
2005-7 
RECON III 
European elections 
media data set 2009  
Timeframe of 
the dataset 
Parliamentary EU 
Treaty ratification:  
Jan. 2004 – Jan. 2009 
TCE Ratification De-
bates:  
June 2005 – July 2007 
European parliamen-
tary election cam-
paigns May – June 
2009 
Scope of 
quantitative / 
qualitative  
data set 
Qualitative dataset: 
plenary debates in six 
EU member states:1  
In total 47 parliamen-
tary debates.  
Quantitative dataset of 
8583 articles, for 6 EU 
member states1;  
240 articles selected for 
qualitative dataset (40 
articles per country) 
Quantitative dataset of 
2841 articles for 6 EU 
member states1,  
181 articles selected 
for qualitative dataset 
(30 articles per coun-
try) 
Search strings 
for sampling 
“Constitutional or 
Lisbon Treaty ratifi-
cation” 
Articles dealing with 
the “EU Constitutional 
Treaty” 
“European election / 
campaign” 
 
Explanations: The three data sets have been constructed from different arenas of European political communication in six EU member 
states – the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the United Kingdom:  
(1) RECON I. Parliamentary Data Set: Constitutional & Lisbon Treaty ratification debates 1/2004 – 1/2009 (6 member states; 
responsible researcher: A. Maatsch). 
(2) ConstEPS/RECON II. Media Data Set: TCE ratification 10/2004 – 10/2005 (responsible researchers: T. Evas, A. 
Maatsch, P. R.Guasti, K.Packham, A. Wyrozumska; see Liebert et al. 2007); merged with TCE crisis and reflection 6/2005 – 
7/2007 (Bremen Summer School July/Aug. 2007 co-coordinated by UniHB and ARENA, responsible researchers: A. Gattig; E. 
Pawlak; see: Liebert/Trenz, RECON WP5 Media Report 2007). 
(3) RECON III. Media Data Set: 2009 European election campaigns 5-6/2009 responsible researchers: K. Packham; E. Pawlak). 
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Table 2: RECON I. Parliamentary Data Set  
 
Country Plenary debates on Constitu-
tional Treaty Ratification 
Plenary debates on Lisbon 
Treaty Ratification 
Czech Republic .... 6 debates: March 2008, Feb. 2009 
by Chamber of Deputies; April 
2008, May 2009 by the Senat. 
France 8 debates: 4 in the National As-
sembly, 4 in the Senate; Jan-Feb, 
April, May 2005. 
3 debates: 2 in the National As-
sembly; 1 in the Senate; Feb. 
2008. 
Germany 4 debates: 2 in the Bundestag, 2 
in the Bandera: Feb, May 2005. 
4 debates: 2 in the Bundestag, 2 
in the Bundesrat; Feb-May 2008. 
Hungary 4 debates: 2 in Oct. 2004; 2 in 
Dec. 2004. 
1 debate: in Dec. 2007. 
Poland 3 debates: 2 in the Sejm – lower 
chamber, 1 in the Senat – higher 
chamber; Feb.-April 2004/2005. 
6 debates: 5 by Sejm, 1 in the 
Senat; Feb.-March 2008, July 
2008, Jan. 2009. 
UK 2 debates: Jan-Feb. 2005 in the 
House of Commons. 
6 debates: 3 in the House of 
Commons, 3 in the House of 
Lords; Dec. 2007, Jan.-June 2008. 
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Table 3: RECON II. and III. comparative media data sets  
 
COUNTRY NEWSPAPERS
Quantitative
Sample
Qualitative
Sample
Quantitative
Sample
Qualitative
Sample
Total No. of
Aticles
Selected No.
of Aticles
Total No. of
Aticles
Selected No.
of Aticles
Czech Republic Hospodarske noviny 361 13 108 7
Pravo 295 17 194 9
MF Dnes 260 8 324 12
Respekt 106 2 … …
Reflex 21 0 13 2
Blesk 6 0 26 1
Total 1049 40 665 31
France Le Monde 1046 19 334 14
Le Figaro 927 12 231 7
Libération 716 9 124 6
Le Parisien … … 137 3
Total 2689 40 826 30
Germany FAZ 927 15 … …
Süddeutsche Zeitung 646 10 336 12
TAZ 371 5 78 6
Welt 680 10 103 7
Bild … … 31 3
Spiegel … … 10 2
Total 2624 40 558 30
Hungary Magyar Nemzet 303 19 153 8
Népszabadság 275 21 126 10
Blikk 5 0 21 3
Heti Világ Gazdaság … … 83 5
Heti Válasz … … 15 2
Élet és Irodalom … … 16 2
Total 583 40 414 30
Poland Gazeta Wyborcza 19 28 11
Rzeczpospolita 16 46 7
Polityka 5 10 4
Nasz Dziennik … … 16 5
Super Express … … 11 3
Total 979 40 111 30
UK The Times 383 19 67 7
The Guardian 276 21 135 12
The Sun … … 30 4
The Daily Mirror … … 21 4
The Economist … … 14 3
Total 659 40 267 30
Total 8583 240 2841 181
RECON DATASAMPLE RECON Summer School
Bremen 2007
RECON Summer School
Bremen 2009
 Post-Referenda Debates EP election campaigns
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